Angelika Beer
MdEP

Internationale Konferenz "Going Nuclear - Needs, Politics and Risks"

Istanbul, 28.02.2005

BOGAZIˆáI UNIVERSITY ¬ñ TÜSIAD
FOREIGN POLICY FORUM

CONFERENCE : GOING NUCLEAR: NEEDS, POLITICS and RISKS

28 February 2005, Istanbul Ceylan Intercontinental Hotel

The conference aimed at discussing regional and international implications of the Iranian nuclear program and the European approach to deal with it as well as analyzing Iranian motivations to acquire nuclear capability.

"Our only option is to cooperate"

Keynote Address by Angelika Beer, the Greens/EFA, European Parliament; Chair of the Delegations for Relations with Iran:


Ambassador Duna, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, let me thank you for your kind invitation and for giving me the opportunity of speaking to this highly respected forum.

Primarily, I will talk to you in my function as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the European Parliament.

Introduction
I think that the organizers of the conference have chosen the right moment to discuss the Iranian nuclear program. In my view, the issue is burning hot - very little time remains to find a cooperative and peaceful solution to the problem. Let m try first to comment on this complex security puzzle - a puzzle in which many pieces still remain to be found.

The Problem
What is the problem with Iran's nuclear program? As a member of the green group in the European Parliament I'm tempted to say that nuclear energy is a bad and risky choice in any case. Besides this general opinion I see the issue as a strategic question in terms of regional stability. That's why we always should discuss the issue in a regional context - and I'm, to a certain extent, optimistic that there is a chance (Spielraum) for combining visions of all three parties: Iran, Europe and the US.

It is my opinion that, in strategic terms, Iran really wants to become a regional player, that is taken seriously first and foremost by the US. In the meantime, the nation's goal seems to be playing a similar role like -for example- Japan: having the option of building the bomb on very short notice. German expert Mr. Thränert from SWP refers to such a nation as a "virtual nuclear power."
These are the reasons why there is still a lack of transparency, an existing enrichment program and the heavy water reactor in Arak.
For Europe and most of the countries in the region, the nuclear program is a great threat to security. As you know, Shahap-3 ballistic missiles have a 1300 km range and thus could reach South Eastern Europe - besides the fact that they easily reach every country within the region. And we face even a more serious threat: A nuclear arms race in the wider Middle East has the potential of completely destabilizing the region. As Israel, Pakistan and Russia already possess nuclear arms, the incentive to join this nuclear club is gaining influence for countries like Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Syria. From an EU perspective, while Turkey is still negotiating its membership, Iran is getting closer and closer to the EU. That means that developments in Iran increasingly affect European security interests. The EU has no interest in a neighbour that has the potential to threaten or blackmail member states. Finally, I see at danger what the European Security Strategy considers as its most powerful tool in order to cope with serious threats: Effective Multilateralism! International treaties like the NPT and international organizations like IAEA are worthless, if they cannot prevent nations from obtaining nuclear weapons!

The Country
Let me say a few words on the Iranian perspective. One part of the problem we face is, that Europe and the US disagree upon the strategy while Iranians have some sort of national consensus. Conservatives as well as Reformers perceive their country as being surrounded by a hostile neighbourhood (and in Iran there is no separation in public debate between civil and military use of the program). Russia, Pakistan, Israel and the US all possess outstanding military means. Let me quote Foreign Minister Charrasi, who said in an interview (FR 16.2.05) that he is concerned about the presence of so many foreign troops in the region - they represent a potential that could be used for interfering in internal affairs of Iran. (¬Ö) I therefore think that PM Erdogan is wrong, when he stated (European Voice 3.2.05) that the Iranian program is emerging from civilian motivation only. My assessment rather is that the Iranian nuclear program has both, civilian and military purposes. The military purpose contradicts the signatures under all international treaties.
And both those motivations can be considered strategically worthwhile, as they focus on a country's independence, regional role, as well as its international status.

Oil is the most valuable good that Iran can sell on the world market. Even though Iran has one of the biggest oil fields in the world at its disposal - these resources are limited (exhausted within 40-50 years), economically thinking, it might make sense to export most of it to fast growing economies as for example China while at the same time satisfying a growing domestic energy market by the use of nuclear power.

Even if the following sounds cynical, at a certain point it might make sense for an Iranian government to work for a nuclear weapons option. Here are the reasons:
First: In order to deter regional nuclear powers like the US, Pakistan and Israel or any other potential enemy.
Second: For the improvement of Iran’s status on both the regional and the international level – as Pakistan choose to do. This also reflects the conviction that Iran - as other global player - has the same right to build the bomb. Questions of autonomy and interdependence are often linked to nationalism.
Third, the Iranian government might be tempted to use the bomb as tool for regional domination especially with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Caspian region. I’m convinced that the country will continue to work on a nuclear weapons option if the situation in the region remains unchanged. To me, the very existence of the heavy water reactor in Arak, the poor cooperation with IAEA and the ballistic missile program are strong indicators for this. For military purposes, ballistic missiles as Sahab-3 only make sense in combination with nuclear warheads.
Thus, for Iran there are good reasons to build the bomb – even if we have no hard evidence – we should consider this a fact and focus our debate on preventive measures. Even if the regime will change one day, there is quite some likelihood that a successor regime will continue the nuclear program as long as the nation continues facing multiple insecurities in the region.

At this point, let me drop out the discussion on the nuclear program for one second and turn towards another topic equally important and not to be ruled out by the ever burning nuclear program issue: I'm almost equally concerned about the current human rights situation and it has to be said that this continues to be a serious burden for our relationship with Iran. The human rights record of Iran is worsening while I speak. This subject is at risk for the benefit of undisturbed anti-nuclear negotiations. It is my opinion however, and as President of the Iran-Delegation of the European Parliament I will do my best always to include human rights in dialogues with Iran. All it takes is consistency concerning the issue.

A Solution?
But is there any solution? Even if the US is the most powerful player in the world, it does not yet have a strategy in dealing with Iran. The actual strategy is a non-strategy that consists of some unhelpful verbal attacks. To be honest, I don’t know what the UN Security Council's position on Iran should be. Even if I don’t think that Russia and China will agree on sanctions. Once sanctions will have been imposed, Iran will immediately expel IAEA inspectors and withdraw from NPT. Should the UN SC then discuss military options? The potential to military escalation is high!

To tell the truth, I don’t think that there is an alternative to the approach adopted by the EU, although it lacks one important element to which I will refer later. The “incentive strategy” that is pushed by France, Great Britain and Germany in the name of 25 European states covers a whole set of important issues. It mainly consists of offering Iran different types of “carrots” for a constructive cooperation with IAEA. The aim is to eliminate every element of the nuclear program that has a dual-use character. First of all, Europeans recognize Iran’s right to build up a nuclear program for civilian purpose. The EU is therefore offering technology transfer in order to help Iran in building up light water reactors. Moreover, the EU – with its internal market that covers 450 Million people – is engaged with Iran in negotiations about a trade and cooperation agreement (TCA). In a similar vain, Europe offered its supporting Iran’s inclusion into the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

But what did the Europeans get until know? We got more information (environmental sampling at undeclared sites) on some details of the program and a certain time span, in which Iran promised to suspend its enrichment program (Paris Agreement) but the question of contamination of centrifuges with highly enriched uranium and the scope of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuges project are among other questions (the ultimate stop of enrichment) still open. And we don't now yet if buying time is wise or if time is not on our side but on the Iranian side.

The big problem of the negotiations between the EU and Iran is that we are lacking a convincing incentive. Trade and light water reactors are important, but not sufficient, if one accepts the strategic dimension of the game. This special carrot and the stick can only be provided by the US. As Foreign minister Charrasi said on 16th February – Iran is ready to give objective guarantees….Iran is ready for dialogue with the US, if the US is ready to accept mutual respect. This could be attained by some sort of "Grand Bargain" on a bilateral basis but I think that the risks of failure because of misunderstandings and misperceptions will be high.
The best way would be to get the US on board. We should also think of including Israel and Turkey as Solana proposed in an interview last week (European Voice 17.2.05). Negotiations should therefore include the relationship between US and Iran, as well as Israel and Iran. I hope that the US is courageous to give this common approach a chance and at the same time wise enough to stop demanding regime change. This request should definitely not be on the agenda at all. If both, Europe and the US pool their incentives, the problem of the Iranian bomb will be solved peacefully.

Let me come to an end expressing my sincere hopes that we will not witness the collision of two strategies over this case, both originating from the so called transatlantic community. Until now, it seems that the US still tries to implement what Condoleezza Rice has laid down within the National Security Strategy NSS: preventive strikes against those rogue states that want to gather weapons of mass destruction and the willingness to change the regime by use of force. On the contrary, Solana's European Security Strategy ESS prioritizes diplomatic, political and non violent tools to attain similar goals. The big challenge now is to urge the US and Israel to join the cooperative approach of the
“three EU's” and to introduce them to negotiations on security guarantees for Iran and its neighbours. In the end this could become the implementation of what is called the Wider Middle East Concept - a concept that responds to the vital interest of the EU, the US, Israel and Turkey.

 

 

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