Angelika Beer
MdEP

Fact-Finding-Mission to Kosovo

19.-22.02.2007

Angelika Beer MEP, Tobias Heider and Paolo Berga- maschi

The context. Our visit took place during the last round of negotiations between Serbia and the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Govern- ment which is ongoing in Vienna under the aegis of the UN Secretary Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari. He is to finalise his report to the Security Council at the end of March. It is difficult to say if and when this body will be able to decide on a new resolution replacing 1244 which should pave the way for the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self Government. Kosovo is still "de jure" part of Serbia even though it is currently a UN protectorate on the way to transferring more and more power and competences to the local authorities. The first Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement was presented by Ahtisaari on 10 February. It does not mention the word "independence" though this is the implicit outcome of the document. Belgrade strongly opposes the self-determination of its province. It considers it a violation of international law. Russia supports Serbia and international pressure is increasing on the UN and the EU to not weaken the democratic and pro-Western forces now in power in Belgrade. The EU is preparing to take over part of the UN powers but in order to start a new phase the UNSC should first adopt a new resolution as mentioned above.

Two days with KFOR. This visit was very useful because of the chance given us by KFOR command to understand better the tasks and the duty KFOR performs daily. The first day at the headquarters General Kather briefed us about present and future scenarios. After the riots of February 2004 when the international peace-keepers were taken by surprise soldiers are now ready to cope with what might happen after the decision on the final status: a) the rejection of the independence by Kosovo Serbs, b) the flight of the Serbian community from the enclaves in the south, c) a terrorist campaign, d) the widespread outbreak of violence, e) a march to the north by the ethnic Albanians to take over Mitrovica in case the Serbian community there declares the independence. It must be pointed out that even though the UN has been downsizing its mission over the last few years there is no intention at present to reduce the international Kosovo Force (17.000 soldiers).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Serbian community. The second day we accompanied a Finnish patrol in its daily duty. We visited a village in one of the Serbian enclaves in the South. Two-thirds of the Serbian community (roughly 80.000 people) live in enclaves while one third (40.000 people) reside in the area of North Mitrovica on the border with Serbia. Serbians living in the enclaves are totally isolated and protected by international soldiers. Everything comes from Belgrade, food, goods, pensions and subsidies. Nearly all who have remained are elderly people since there is hardly any future for the youth. We also had a short stop at the monument of Kosovo Polje where in 1989 Milosevic was able to gather one million people announcing the end of the autonomy of the province. This is considered to be the starting point of the Yugoslavian tragedy. Far-sighted observers in the nineties used to say that the conflict in Yugoslavia started in Kosovo and it will finish in Kosovo. It seems that that moment has now arrived. All the religious and cultural sites are, anyway, heavily defended by KFOR.
In North Mitrovica we had a chance to meet with Oliver Ivanovic who represents the part of the Serbian community willing to cooperate with the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, contrary to those who refuse any kind of collaboration. He is a member of the Kosovo Assembly. In the previous days he made statements opposing the partition of the province on the grounds that this could harm the Serbs living in the enclaves. Unfortunately he now notes that partition is unavoidable because, according to him, there are insufficient guarantees for the Kosovo Serbs in the Ahtisaari's proposal. First of all there is no veto power or double majority foreseen; secondly the request for 10 new Serbian municipalities has been rejected (NB only 5 new ones and the enlargement of an existing one have been accepted); thirdly, even though 2.500 soldiers seem few Kosovo Serbs consider the establishment of a Kosovo Security Force a threat . He is convinced that right after Kosovo declares its independence North Mitrovica will declare its own. It must be pointed out that according to the information we got from KFOR the security situation of northern Kosovo is completely under control but this does not mean necessarily that international soldiers will be ordered to use force to bring this region back to Pristina. In Ivanovic's opinion Putin will keep his promise to use its veto at the UN Security Council.

Meeting with Ruecker. The clear and unequivocal message from all the interlocutors of the international community we met was unanimous: "Do not delay the decision about the final status. Uncertainty does not help anyone; on the contrary, it aggravates the already difficult situation". The UN Secretary General Special Representative for Kosovo highlighted the necessity to keep the momentum of the status process. Timetables should be respected, and the key to further progress is in Belgrade. There is the need to explain the Ahtisaari's plan to people. The international community must focus now on status and standards implementation and, above all, the EU must reach a common position quickly. As to Serbia's strategy, he pointed out that it is based on 5 "D’s": discredit the plan, divide international community, delay the process, destabilize Kosovo and derail the talks. Kosovo authorities and the international community must not fall into that trap.

UNMIK EU pillar and EUPT. EU officials pointed out that there cannot be an International Civilian Office (ICO) without replacing UNSC 1244 with a new resolution. The future EUMIK will not be a colonial administration. There will be no intrusive powers like in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the OHR. It is very important to stress the EU perspective for Kosovo while we are moving from CARDS to IPA. The ESDP mission will consist of about 1700 people, of which about 700 will be policemen. They will also have executive competences in the field of organised crime and war criminals. It will be accompanied by a sizable support package for the status implementation. The EU agenda for Kosovo is based 50 percent on status implementation and 50 percent on structural reforms. EUPT though wishes to see Kosovo moving more seriously towards structural reforms. EUPT is already preparing a list of laws that have to be adopted in order to implement the status. There will be muscular guarantees as regards certain aspects (monitoring, mentoring and helping but also willingness to take over some prerogatives). There are no intention of keeping powers longer than necessary (ethnic mistrust and weakness of institutions must be overcome first).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Meeting with Kosovo PISG. We met Fatmir Sejdiu, president, Agim Ceku, prime minister and some members of the Kosovo Assembly's Committee for International Relations and European Integration. Kosovars are willing to give up sovereignty once they get it. There is no intention to challenge the Ahtisaari's plan though there are doubts about it being workable. The EU presence is welcomed and necessary. Serbia will never agree, and delay is the worst thing that can happen. Uncertainty is the cause of economic and social stagnation and is leading to further frustration and confusion. Kosovo is ready for the status and looking forward to a new UNSC resolution. With regard to the violent demonstration and the bombing of UNMIK cars during the last days the government underlined that these actions are not representative for the majority of Kosovars. Nevertheless they pointed to the fact that another possible delay of the status resolution will make the management of expectations more difficult also with regard to those events.

Conclusions. Everybody seems unsatisfied with the present situation for different reasons: international organisations because of the unclear future, Kosovo politicians because they have no real power, ordinary people because they do not understand or are not informed about the status process, Serbs because they live in separate cages. That does not mean that all these actors will be happy after the decision on the final status is taken, but at least the situation will be clear and all the parties will be in the position to overcome the present deadlock. Independence is not a matter of "if" but rather of "when and "how". What to do is already listed in Joost's report on the future role of the EU in Kosovo. Two items, anyway, are of absolute priority for the EU: 1) a common position and 2) a stronger and reinforced EU perspective for Kosovo. Kosovo is set to become a maturity test for the EU. A failure is not allowed. We risk our reputation but we cannot refrain from making every effort in order to open wide the doors of the EU to the Balkan countries.

 

 

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