Angelika Beer
MdEP

Where will defence be in 2025?

21.12.2006

By Mihael Brejc and Angelika Beer

Two MEPs discuss the future of the European Security and Defence Policy

Mihael Brejc

In a world where the only certain thing is change, in an environment full of diversity, conflicts and tension, faced with rapidly evolving technology, it is difficult to predict the state of European defence in 2025.

It is probable that the EU will have reached its geographical and institutional borders by that time, most likely without Turkey, which will, however, have become a dominant regional power and an important partner of the EU. We will be able to witness the advantages of a united Europe in the globalisation era, with the EU becoming a global actor in both the political and economic arena. By that time, we will also reach a critical point concerning demography, the environment and energy supply.

In order to analyse the defence perspective, we should take into account the numbers and structure of the European population in 2025. According to Eurostat, the population growth rate will decline in most European countries, despite increased migration flows and longer life-expectancy. This poses some serious questions for security and defence matters. Even though the share of immigrants will increase, the population will not be sufficient to satisfy all the requirements of national defence and security. Free movement of people, capital, goods and services will significantly contribute to a more dynamic and effective internal market, but at the same time the safety of people and of their wealth will decrease. Taking into account the different internal conflicts and tensions that the multicultural European community will be facing, one of the constant debates within the EU will probably be the discussion on the balance to be struck between security and freedom.

The terrorist danger will not decrease, as most groups related to radical Islamic movements will continue with their activities, not only in Arab countries but also in the wider Middle East region, in the EU and in south and central Asia. Economic difficulties and high unemployment rates (especially among the young) in certain Islamic countries will form a breeding base for terrorism. There will be more al-Qaeda type terrorist groups that will use modern technology to achieve their goals, they will be even more flexible and will have no permanent base. While we also cannot exclude the danger of chemical, biological and cyber-terrorism, classical weapons, terrorists will still have classical weapons in their armouries and harbour ambitions of wielding weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist groups will develop further their links with criminals in order to obtain forged documents, weapons and assistance with the transfer of persons and equipment.

In 2025, EU military forces will be less numerous and will be used mostly for rapid reaction in ensuring EU defence, being used more often for this type of role than for offensive action. It is also highly unlikely that we will witness in Europe the type of wars that took place in the 20th century. Can we predict the structure of military formations if we take into account the structure of the general population, where the share of immigrants within it will continue to grow? Since there will be fewer people suitable for military service, more weight will be given to the development of warfare strategy and tactics, to new technologies and instruments for remote action, namely from air and outer space. We will also experience many difficulties in the harmonisation of European armed forces, due to rapid developments in military technology.

The EU will not develop its own military forces, which could substitute for NATO and it will therefore not become a military force, as the US is today. It will continue to promote peace and prosperity by offering non-military assistance and will derive its influence on world affairs from its model of democracy, a free-market economy and its variety of social models. Last but not least, our security and defence systems will be more efficient if we continue to develop a higher security culture within our own population.


Slovenian centre-right MEP Mihael Brejc is vice-chairman of the Parliamentís sub-committee on security and defence.


Angelika Beer

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana once said that European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) developed with the ìspeed of lightî. The veracity of his statement can be seen in the rapid advances towards a European defence policy in recent years, against the backdrop of the period from 1954 to 1998 in which all efforts to build a European defence policy failed. The main reason for the rapid speed of the development of ESDP was the strong pressure from the demand side. In the 1990s, there was an increase in demand for EU-crisis management, especially for the neighbouring Balkans. But the EU was unable to respond. In the following years, more demands arose: peace talks in Aceh, security sector reform and police missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since the creation of ESDP in 1999 there have already been 17 missions and in future the demand will even increase, as the quantity of conflicts and crises also increases.

But ESDP is far from complete today. Many essential components of a coherent defence policy, as laid out in the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, are missing. In general, ESDP is not well integrated into the larger EU framework. Besides the unsolved question of the constitutional treaty and a EU foreign minister, a number of other strategic choices have not been made. We are still lacking an important element that could bridge ESDP and the European Security Strategy. There is the clear need for this to be addressed, through a white paper, as there is currently no definition of the conditions under which EU troops or police could intervene. There is also no link between ESDP and the European Commissionís institutions, instruments and policies. With the new financial instruments for external assistance, especially the stability instrument, the Commission got the mandate to draft country strategies also encompassing security aspects. As security is a complex concept, ESDP must be mainstreamed with the Commissionís foreign policy, as well as with trade, development, environment, agriculture and fisheries. Otherwise the EU will never be able to eliminate the root causes of conflict and only act as a fire-fighter. Finally, there is not enough co-ordination between ESDP and what the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Commission are planning to do in the sector of defence industries. Even as a Green politician, I agree that we need to expand the rules of the common market to the defence sector ñ a domain which is not transparent, inefficient and misuses taxpayersí money. But this framework will only be legitimate if products are produced for real ESDP missions, not for scenarios that are never going to happen, such as aircraft carriers for an ESDP armada in the Mediterranean, as called for in a report to Parliament from Karel Von Wogau.

How the ESDP will look in 25 years very much depends on the decisions taken today ñ and many decisions remain to be taken. The most important is the decision on how to pursue the harmonisation of national capabilities and institutions. This harmonisation must be pursued in a way that does not prevent further integration at a later stage ñ even for a ëEuropean armyí if there is political will for this in the future. Furthermore, ESDP cannot continue to disregard civilian crisis prevention ñ this leads to an increased tendency for knee-jerk military responses and inhibits the development of a larger political concept for crisis resolution. To achieve this, EDSP must not be run by military personnel at the expense of a civilian staff. On the contrary, civilians should be given prime position and civilian capabilities must be increased in quality and quantity. Finally, ESDP needs thorough democratic scrutiny, especially with regard to possible deployment of the so-called battle groups. Failure to secure public support, by failing to take account of the opinions of EU citizens or their direct representatives in decisions on deployments will prevent the ESDP from becoming a modern and legitimate security policy mechanism.


German Green MEP Angelika Beer is a member of the Parliamentís sub-committee on security and defence.

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