Angelika Beer
MdEP

Bridging the Crisis Management – Peacebuiding gap?

Berlin, am 26.04.2007

The new Stability Instrument and possible CSO contributions

Dear ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

I am particularly pleased with the opportunity to talk today about the European Union's new Stability Instrument. As the rapporteur on this matter for the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, I have spent the last two years on developing and adopting this promising new instrument of EU crisis management and conflict prevention. At the same time, I am fully aware that the new legal provisions still have to be implemented and that there is still much to be done in terms of the EU's capabilities and performance in this field. This is true not least when it comes to the involvement of civil society organisations in the implementation and evaluation of the Stability Instrument.

This instrument is one of the newest available on the European level and I place some real hopes in it. The Stability Instrument was introduced at the beginning of the year as part of the so-called "Prodi-Package". Together with seven other instruments, it represents the legal and financial basis of the Community foreign policy. With its 2 billion euros budget for the period of 2007 to 2013, the Stability Instrument significantly strengthens the EU's civilian intervention capacity. Using a single legal instrument, the Union will be able to initially react to crises in third countries rapidly, flexibly and coherently until a co-operation based on the other EU mechanisms needing some more response time is possible.
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Before I recall some of the Stability Instrument's key features and inform you of the latest developments of its implementation, please let me first comment on its broader context; that is the European Union's general approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. At present, there are three principal short-comings in this respect.

1) Firstly, the European policy is incoherent due to the institutional split-up between the first and second pillar. This finding is not new. However, the more responsibility the European Union bears in the field of foreign and security policy, the more urgent is the need for a remedy to the institutional and political incoherence. Part of such a remedy must be the strengthening of the Community institutions; that is, the Commission and the Parliament. Thereby, the second-pillar foreign and security policy, the first-pillar development policy and the yet-to-be-developed energy policy could be better co-ordinated, with particularly the Commission safeguarding the overall coherence of the concerned EU policies.

2) On the other hand, and this is my second point, this strengthening of the Commission and Parliament would at the same time significantly increase the transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy of Europe's conflict management and conflict prevention. Likewise, only by increasing the role of the Commission and the Parliament can civil society actors be better involved in the process. Other than the EU Council, the Commission and, in the first place, the Parliament can offer proper channels for NGOs to become part of the decision-making. So, in this respect, the need for a strong coalition of the Parliament and the civil society is obvious and I hope that we can further co-operate to that end.

3) The third short-coming I see concerns the policy substance itself. So far, the EU has focused too much on crisis management and too little on conflict prevention, thereby neglecting policies that aim at reducing or eliminating the underlying causes of conflicts. Likewise, we face a gradual militarization of Europe's external relations, at the expense of short-term civilian crisis management as well as long-term political concepts. In this respect, it is in the first place the Council that is to be blamed, as the Member States are one-sided working on strengthening the EU's military capacity. How ineffective and potentially dangerous security policies that are not integrated in a broader political concept can be is illustrated by the example of EUFOR in Congo.
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I belief you will all agree that the three short-comings just described are heavily interlinked and call for a comprehensive approach. One step in this endeavour is the Stability Instrument as it addresses all three aspects mentioned. It represents a bridge between long-term measures in the field of development policy and short-term CFSP and ESDP actions. It comprises a broad set of civilian crisis management and prevention policies and strengthens the Commission and the Parliament.

To be more specific, the Stability Instrument was adopted in the form of an EU regulation in accordance with the co-decision procedure. That is, the Parliament was fully involved in its development and I myself spent one and a half year on negotiating with the Commission and Council. In fact, it was the first time the Parliament was granted the right of co-decision in the foreign policy area.

Let me know briefly summarize some of the Stability Instrument's key characteristics. As most of you will know, it expressively envisages two types of interventions:

• Crisis-related, urgent actions, such as non-military peace building and peace keeping actions and all reconstruction measures after conflicts or natural disasters.
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• Long-term assistance under stable conditions for cooperation. This includes actions against terrorism and organized crime, measures to protect international transport and energy supply routes and to combat epidemics of global scale. The long-term actions also aim at enhancing the capacity of international, regional or sub-regional actors in the area of pre- and post-crisis activities.

Concerning both short-term and long-term measures, the Stability Instrument provides for financial and technical support for civilian actions of international and regional organisations, state actors as well as non-governmental organisations.

Together with the help of NGOs, the Greens and the Parliament in whole succeeded in incorporating some overdue and promising features in the Stability Instrument. Besides the parliamentary control of future foreign policy planning in the concerned area, this includes civilian measures against SALW and clearance and stockpile destruction of landmines and duds. It also includes programmes to demobilise and reintegrate former combatants and child soldiers. Moreover, the instrument allows for the particular concerns of women in all fields of action. As an additional feature let me also highlight a binding declaration of the Commission. Therein, the Commission reassures that it will strictly respect human rights in its struggle against terrorism.

Clearly, I am pleased with all these measures being included in the Stability Instrument. However, when it comes to the involvement of civil society organisations in the European efforts, the most prominent feature is the Peace-building Partnership that was introduced together with the Stability Instrument. It provides for the development of a representative network of NGOs engaged in conflict prevention, early warning, peace building and post-conflict operations. The Peace-building Partnership also allows for direct financial support for regional organisations and networks to increase their respective capabilities. Finally, it sets up contact and coordination offices within the Commission, both in Brussels and on the ground, responsible for short-term administrative and logistic assistance.
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Concluding, I would like to give you a brief outline of the current state of play. Regarding the long-term assistance of the Stability Instrument, the Commission is presently preparing a strategy paper on its priorities. The document is due to be adopted in late May. Then, the Parliament will have a month to respond to it. Today, I can already indicate some of the projects the Commission plans to cover in the first two-year period. This includes actions on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, support of programmes tackling drug trafficking from Afghanistan, and assistance to the African Union in the areas of SALW and anti-terrorism. In addition, the Commission plans to finance, among others, the Policy Advice Mediation Facility and the Kimberley Process.

When it comes to short-term activities, the Commission expects to contribute to programmes in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and possibly also in Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.

Considering this list of critical regions of short-term actions and demanding long-term tasks, I think we are all aware that the Stability Instrument is facing a challenging future. I would really appreciate you being as eager to contribute to its success as I am. That is why I hope it has become clear that the Stability Instrument is a promising new means in the EU's work on conflicts. Especially the Peace-building Partnership relies on a strong commitment of civil society. Here, we have to work together to get the concerned NGOs as much involved as possible. For the Stability Instrument being a new, flexible and dynamic tool, it is up to us, the Parliamentarians and civil society, to shape it the right way and to overcome short-comings where they still exist. Therefore, I am looking forward to the discussions in the afternoon workshops and your input on this matter.

 

 

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